We cover the obligations that apply where an attack produces a physical consequence. That means plant, grid, pipeline, water and manufacturing, where an attacker can move, heat or stop physical equipment.

What we track

NIS2 in operational technology

EU. How the reporting and risk management duties apply to plant operational technology at in-scope manufacturers.

NERC CIP

US electricity. Internal network security monitoring under CIP-015, approved by FERC in 2025 and enforceable for control centres from 1 October 2028.

TSA security directives

US pipelines and rail. Architecture, segmentation and testing requirements, and the cycle on which TSA renews them.

CISA guidance for OT and ICS

US and international. Internet exposure reduction and asset visibility expectations.

Singapore critical services

Singapore. Advisories and code of practice provisions for operational technology in critical services.

IEC 62443

International. The standard regulators reach for when they need to say what good looks like.

Who is in scope

Operators of essential services first: energy, water, transport, health and manufacturing at scale. In the EU, you are in scope if your sector is on the NIS2 lists. In the US, each sector has its own instrument: NERC standards for electricity and TSA directives for pipelines and rail, with CISA guidance more broadly.

Manufacturers are the group that most often assumes it is outside. NIS2 lists manufacturing sub-sectors in Annex II, so its duties apply to plant operational technology, although the directive was written with IT in mind.

Key dates

NERC standards become enforceable on a set date and are then audited. TSA renews its directives on a cycle and tightens them at each renewal. NIS2 obligations apply from your member state’s commencement date.

The constraint that matters is the maintenance window. Most OT change happens during a planned shutdown. If a regulator sets a compliance date between two shutdowns, you have to finish the work at the earlier one.

Where organisations get caught

Reporting clocks now apply to plant incidents. An operational technology incident at an in-scope manufacturer can trigger the same notification duties as an IT incident. Plant teams are rarely part of the notification process. The person who first sees the anomaly is frequently a shift engineer with no route into it.

Component provenance. Governments restrict foreign-made equipment in power and control systems, so choosing a supplier is now a compliance decision. The affected assets have twenty-year lifecycles, and replacing them is a capital programme with a multi-year budget.

Asset visibility. Almost every regulator now expects you to know what is on the network, and OT environments frequently cannot be scanned safely. Passive discovery is the answer. Someone has to budget for it.

Questions to ask now

  • Do we have an asset inventory for OT, and how was it built?
  • Which plants are in scope under which regime, and does the plant manager know?
  • If a shift engineer saw something odd at 2am, what would they do and who would hear about it?
  • What is directly reachable from the internet today, and when did we last check?
  • Which control system components come from restricted suppliers, and what is the replacement plan?
  • When is the next maintenance window, and what compliance work is queued for it?

Related domains

We cover the clocks that now apply to plant incidents in Incident reporting, machinery on the same networks in Robotics and autonomous systems, and component provenance in Third-party and supply chain risk.

See all sixteen domains we track and how the Radar works.

The Stratsec Radar

Technology risk regulation across sixteen domains and four jurisdictions, read and approved by people who have run security programmes. US$12,000 per year, excluding VAT, with sixty days to change your mind.

See how the Radar works

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